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GADAMER: INCARNATION, FINITUDE, AND 
THE EXPERIENCE OF DIVINE INFINITUDE 
Patricia Altenbernd Johnson 
This paper examines the importance of the concept of Incarnation for the 
work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The first section traces the role of the Incar-
nation in his work on the center or medium of language. The second part 
examines the threefold description of human finitude that Gadamer develops 
and shows the continuing importance of the concept of Incarnation. The third 
part discusses the implementation of this understanding of human finitude 
for the experience of divine infinitude. The final section outlines implications 
of Gadamer's work for contemporary work in the philosophy of religion. 
In the third part of Wahrheit und Methode, Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, 
Something new arises in the middle of the penetration of Christian theology 
by the Greek idea of logic: the center of language, in which the mediation of 
the incarnation event is first brought to its full truth. Christology becomes 
the pioneer of a new anthropology, which mediates in a new way the human 
spirit in its finitude with divine infinitude (WM p. 405; TM p. 428, Transla-
tion mine). 
While Gadamer is not usually treated as a religious philosopher or a philoso-
pher of religion, this quotation is indicative of the importance of religious 
concepts for his philosophical hermeneutics. In this paper, I will trace the 
role of the concept of Incarnation in Gadamer's formulation of the center of 
language as the place of human finitude. I will then sketch the description of 
human finitude that Gadamer develops showing the threefold structure that 
his description suggests. I will discuss the implications of this understanding 
of human finitude for the experience of divine infinitude, showing that Gada-
mer's description of finitude guides his understanding of the human experi-
ence of divine infinitude. Finally, I will suggest some implications of this 
reading for some contemporary work in the philosophy of religion. 
Incarnation as Guide 
In developing philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer makes use of what he 
calls guides (Leitfaden). These are concepts that are present in our tradition 
that can lead us to understanding and to self-understanding if only we take 
the time to follow them. In using these guides he is, of course, taking the 
approach that Heidegger developed with his emphasis on pathways. While 
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Heidegger, in an interview given to Der Speigel in ] 966 and printed after his 
death in 1976, suggests that our era awaits a new saving event ("Nur noch ... "), 
that is, a new way of gaining entry to an experience of the infinitude, Gadamer 
begins with the Incarnation, an event within Western tradition. The task is to 
follow the Incarnation to see if it can lead us to a position that facilitates an 
experience of the infinite that is appropriate to us. In following the Christian 
idea of the Incarnation, Gadamer focuses on its close connection with the 
concept of the Word. He believes that the idea of Incarnation has prevented 
Western thought from completely forgetting the nature of language and 
thereby completely forgetting our own finitude. Gadamer finds the basis for 
his explorations of language as the medium of human finitude in the medieval 
discussions of verbum and of Trinity which focus on the problem of the Word 
(WM p. 395; TM p. 418). 
These discussions emphasize that the Christian understanding of Incarna-
tion is not the Greek notion of embodiment. If incarnation were embodiment, 
it would be a movement of the divine showing itself in human form while 
retaining all of the superhuman capabilities of divinity. Rather, the Christian 
understanding of Incarnation stresses the event structure of this movement. 
The Incarnation is the historical unity of finite and infinite. What is signifi-
cant about this event, indeed, what is miraculous, is in part what it is not. 
"The act of becoming .. .is not the kind of becoming in which something turns 
into something else" (WM p. 397; TM p. 420). It is not a process that sepa-
rates the finite from the infinite, nor is it a process in which the infinite is 
diminished by becoming finite. The Incarnation event presents the divine as 
incarnate as consubstantial with the divine as creator. Gadamer says, "That 
the Word is with God from all eternity is the victorious doctrine of the church 
in its defense against subordinationism" (WM p. 397; TM p. 420). 
Gadamer contends that the Incarnation adds an important dimension to 
philosophical understanding. "If the Word became flesh and if it is only in 
the (I)ncarnation that spirit is fully realized, then the logos is freed from its 
spirituality, which means at the same time, from its cosmic potentiality" (WM 
p. 396; TM p. 419). The spiritual is no longer viewed as ahistorical, perfect 
in its separation from the material and historical realm. The Incarnation is 
the Word as pure event. Because of this event structure, Incarnation provides 
philosophical thought entrance into the mysterious unity of the finite and the 
infinite through the phenomenon of language. 
"Die Mitte der Sprache und ihre spekulative Struktur" is the section of 
Wahrheit und Methode that contains Gadamer's most complete outline of the 
experience of human finitude. This section begins with the recognition that 
explorations of language have, since Plato, taken a theological direction. That 
is, language is viewed as the expression of the relation of thought and being. 
"In considering the being of beings, Greek metaphysics regarded it as a being 
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that fulfilled itself in thought" (WM p. 432; TM p. 456). Human thought takes 
its fulfilled potential to be "the infinity of this presence" (WM p. 432; TM 
p. 457). This way of thinking, a way that Gadamer rejects, holds that humans 
are potentially divine, potentially infinite. Achieving this divine infinitude is 
understood as the highest human possibility. 
Gadamer notes that Hegel, too, follows this way of thinking. Hegel also 
maintained that the infinite Idea of the Incarnation can be termed the specu-
lative midpoint. It is the center from which the divine relation to the world, 
including humanity, can be understood. But Hegel follows the Incarnation 
event very differently than does Gadamer. For Hegel, the Incarnation makes 
explicit the divine presence such that knowledge of God becomes possible 
as does the infinity of human existence. This infinity is achieved, however, 
at the cost of leaving human finitude behind. Hegel writes: 
Thus finite spirit is itself posited as a moment of God. Humans themselves, 
therefore, are comprehended in the concept of God, and this comprehension 
may be thus expressed-that the unity of human beings with God is posited 
in the Christian religion. But this union must not be superficially conceived, 
as if God were merely human, and humans were likewise God. Rather, hu-
mans are God only to the extent that they transcend the naturality and finitude 
of their spirit and elevate themselves to God (VGP p. 392, translation mine). 
For Hegel, the incarnation event is the actual occurrence in which humans 
perceive "the immediate certainty and presence of divinity" (TCR p. 171). 
God is known as living Spirit. In this concept of God as Spirit, humans come 
to understand what it means for them to be spirit. Hegel says, "the divine and 
human natures are not intrinsically different: God appears in human form. 
The truth is that there is only one reason, only one Spirit. We have seen that 
Spirit does not have a genuine or truthful existence as finite" (p. 177). The 
Incarnation is the concrete example of what this means. There must be death 
of finitude as "something alien to God" (p. 213). Natural finitude must be 
sublated. In the resurrection, finitude is put to death in its independence and 
is recognized only as a moment of God. This is a change in the human 
condition such that it is "thoroughly altered and transfigured by the Spirit" 
(p. 217). Finitude is a disappearing moment in God. For humans to exist in 
truth, they must acknowledge this reconciliation and join in the community 
of Spirit which expresses the consciousness of truth for human nature. This 
community is the Christian community which is in its beginning stages the 
Church and then is ethical life or community. The reconciliation that begins with 
the Incarnation comes to its fullness when the ethical community recognizes and 
realizes its truth as infinite and no longer rests in the satisfaction of finitude. 
Gadamer follows the guide of the Incarnation in a very different manner. 
The Incarnation does not primarily serve to free humanity from finitude; 
rather, it is far more the freeing of logos from spirituality. If the Word is fully 
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infinite, it is also fully finite. Following the Incarnation as a guide, Gadamer 
enters language and articulates an understanding of human finitude. 
The Center of Language and Human Finitude 
Following the guidance of the Incarnation, Gadamer rejects the idea that 
language is the place of discovering and achieving our infinitude. Rather, 
language is "die Spur der Endlichkeit" (WM p. 433; TM p. 457); it is the 
trace or record of finitude. In language our historical nature and our relation 
to world is mediated to ourselves. Gadamer describes finite humans as situ-
ated in the Mitre, the center or medium, of language. A preliminary under-
standing of this situatedness helps set the context for Gadamer's 
reconstruction of human finitude. This position is a center where the paths 
for ordering and structuring our experiences cross, have their origins, and 
find their connections. It is also a medium, not a foundation, in which our 
finite nature is mediated to us. Our finitude is not something that is immedi-
ate. Rather, to understand our finitude we must begin in this centered position. 
It is a position in which we find ourselves. We do not pick up language as a 
tool of self-understanding to be transcended. Rather, language is the medium 
in which we are and in which we must remain. It is, however, a position of 
opening towards a whole. It is the position from which and in which we are 
related to the totality of beings. Recognizing this finitude, however, does not 
separate us from the infinite. "Every word carries with it the unsaid, to which 
it is related by responding and indicating" (WM p. 434; TM p. 416). In tracing 
our finitude, we not only reconstruct our human finitude, we also trace our 
relation to divine infinitude. The final lines of A. R. Ammons' poem, "Un-
said," illustrates the position that Gadamer describes: 
what is missing: it is only that what is missing 
cannot 
be missed if 
spoken: read the parables of my unmaking: 
feel the ris-
ing bubble's trembling walls: rush into the domes 
these wordy arches shape: hear 
me 
when I am 
silent: gather the boundaried vacancies. 
Tracing human finitude from within the centered position of the medium 
of language, Gadamer identifies three fundamental structures of this finitude: 
ZugehOrigkeit (belongingness), Horen (hearing), and Sagen (saying). Gada-
mer does not specifically label these as the threefold structure of human 
finitude. However, reading his work in this way emphasizes the influence of 
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the concept of the Incarnation for both his understanding of human finitude 
and for his later suggestions about human experience of divine infinitude. His 
description of these structures again follows Heidegger's approach. These are 
not characteristics of a human finitude that is structurally more fundamental. 
Rather, these three are equiprimordially constitutive of human finitude. 
Gadamer notes that in philosophy the concept of belongingness has a long 
history. In the Greek metaphysics of both Plato and Aristotle "there is no 
question of a self-conscious spirit without world which would have to find 
its way to worldly being; both belong originally to each other. The relation-
ship is primary" (WM p. 434; TM p. 459). In all thought that is teleological, 
including the theory of evolution, the whole is understood as more original 
than the parts. While the science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
moves away from this notion of belongingness, it is never able to deny 
entirely the coordination of the subject and the object. Indeed, the issue arises 
anew in the nineteenth century focus on dialectic, especially in Hegel. Gada-
mer's brief tracing of this history is done in order to make the point that there 
is "an internal necessity of the thing itself (Sache)" that moves us "toward 
the idea that subject and object belong together" (WM p. 437; TM p. 461). 
From the hermeneutical position in the center of language, Gadamer de-
scribes this belongingness as both encounter and emergence of the new. The 
finite human neither conforms objectivity to itself, nor is required to conform 
itself to objectivity. Rather, the experience of belongingness of human finitude 
is one of encounter. The part of Wahrheit und Methode that explores the logic 
of question and answer provides a more thorough description of encounter. 
At the oral examination at the beginning of my doctoral studies I was asked 
what I most wanted to achieve in the course of graduate work. I answered 
that I wanted to learn to ask questions. I left that examination thinking that 
my examiners must think me rather simple to be entering graduate work 
unable to ask questions. Over the years I have come to recognize the insight 
of my own simplicity. Gadamer recalls how many of the partners in Socratic 
dialogues thought the role of questioner to be the easiest until they tried it. 
Like Socrates, Gadamer emphasizes that to be able to question requires rec-
ognition of "radical negativity: the knowledge of not knowing" (WM p. 344; 
TM p. 362). Moreover, a question places that which is questioned in the open, 
that is, in a horizon in which it can be explored. What we discover, perhaps 
most clearly in trying to ask questions, is that it is we who are questioned 
and that the open in which we are placed is that of tradition COberlieferung), 
that which is handed down to us. Gadamer writes, 
The voice that speaks to us from the past (Das Uberlieferte, das uns an-
spricht)-whether text, work, trace-itself poses a question and places our 
meaning in openness. In order to answer the question put to us the interrogated, 
we must ourselves begin to ask questions (WM pp. 355-56; TM p. 374). 
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As finite humans, we belong to a tradition that always already constitutes our 
being and that calls us into question. 
But the experience of belongingness also shows us that we do not stand in 
relation to an unchanging fixity that defines us by establishing immutable 
limits. This belonging ness has the character of conversation in which some-
thing new emerges. In a genuine conversation the focus is on what is under 
discussion, the subject matter. When either partner in a conversation shifts 
the focus from the subject matter to making a point or winning an argument, 
conversation breaks down. In a successful conversation the sharing and ex-
change results in the changing of both participants. Gadamer says, 
both corne under the influence of the truth of the subject matter (Sache) and 
are thus bound to one another in a new community. To reach an understanding 
in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and success-
fully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a com-
munion in which we do not remain what we were (WM p. 360; TM p. 379). 
The conjunction of encounter with tradition and conversation in which there 
is emergence of the new results in a fluid understanding of the belongingness 
of human finitude. It is we who are questioned, who are the subject of 
conversation. As such we already are situated within tradition. But tradition 
is also our partner in conversation. As we participate in this conversation, as 
we raise questions, tradition is opened and new parameters emerge, new 
communion is formed. Both tradition and human finitude, together, take on 
new dimensions. 
Gadamer is again emphasizing the equipriomordial character of the struc-
ture of human finitude. No one aspect, in this case tradition or contemporary 
subjects, has a place of priority or privilege. These structures belong together. 
The concept of the Incarnation that led Gadamer to language as the place for 
exploring human finitude continues to be evident. He emphasizes the event 
character of this belongingness. This event 
is made possible only because the word that has come down to us as tradition 
and to which we are to listen really encounters us and does so as if it 
addressed us and is concerned with us (WM p. 437; TM p. 461). 
The image of the Incarnation as Word remains the guiding image emphasizing 
the unity of finitude and infinitude. 
The listening that this address requires suggests a second fundamental 
structure of human finitude, horen. We are hearers. Gadamer emphasizes that 
we cannot turn away from hearing in the same manner that we can refuse to 
see. But to hear is also to experience the world in a "completely new dimen-
sion" (WM p. 438; TM p. 462). Moreover, hearing both enables and takes 
place in language. Gadamer's description of hearing is presented only briefly 
in Wahrheit und Methode, yet is an important aspect of human finitude. Some 
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simple examples are helpful for illustrating Gadamer's points. Anyone who 
has lived with a small child as he or she learns language knows how hearing 
opens completely new dimensions of the world. I remember teaching my son 
to talk. Taking long walks on the beach in Toronto, my husband and I would 
say "dog" each time we met someone walking a dog. One day, of course, our 
son spoke the word and suddenly his world was full of dogs. Learning to 
distinguish white and blue was more difficult. Our car was both colors, and 
somehow in the learning process the two became confused. It took several 
months for him to clearly differentiate the two. This experience is also there 
for the adult learning a new language. As a young woman just graduated from 
college, I took a summer job as a chambermaid in a small mountain hotel in 
Switzerland. I spoke no German, but most of the people with whom I spent 
my workdays spoke only German. As one who enjoyed philosophical conver-
sation, I was frustrated by my inability to understand and convey even the 
most simple ideas. I will never forget the day when, sitting at a table for the 
noon meal, I realized that those at the table behind me were talking about 
me-and I understood without visible effort and without translation. Both of 
these examples help illustrate Gadamer's points about hearing as a funda-
mental structure of human finitude. Hearing is more than the immediate 
sensory stimulation; it is understanding. But understanding can only take 
place when one is immersed in the words and is encountered by them. 
This requires uninterrupted listening and is, therefore, an undergoing (Er-
leiden). We must remove our own expectations and allow ourselves to be 
acted upon. It is difficult to know what expectations children must remove 
in the process of learning language. Perhaps they learn so quickly because 
they listen without presuppositions. As with my son's confusion of white and 
blue, it may only be as we establish expectations that those expectations 
function as impediments to hearing. Certainly, by the time one is an adult 
one language serves in part as an impediment to learning another. The expec-
tation of certain sounds makes it difficult to "hear" other sounds. 
Yet, that we are hearing beings shows us that our finitude is not something 
from which we strive to be freed. The more we understand, the more lan-
guages we speak, the more possible impediments we bring to any under-
standing. Yet, the more we understand, the more languages we speak, the 
more new dimensions can reach us. 
The importance of the guiding idea of the Incarnation is again evident in 
this description of hearing. Incarnation is not an overcoming or escape from 
the contingencies of historical existence. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, also a German 
Lutheran and contemporary with Gadamer until his death in 1945, describes 
this aspect of Incarnation as humiliation. He says, "The mode of existence 
of humiliation is an act of the Incarnate .... The God-man in history is always 
already the humiliated God-man, from the cradle to the cross" (p. 111). This 
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understanding does not posit omnipotence and omniscience as the divine 
essence or as the goal of human finitude, rather humility and openness are 
emphasized in the unity of finite and infinite. 
Gadamer's description of hearing shows human finitude to have a dialectic 
structure that he terms speculative. He follows Hegel's use of the term specu-
lative insofar as it is a mirror relation. The mirror has no being of its own, 
or more properly, its being is to disappear so that what is seen is that which 
is reflected. Moreover, mirroring reflects not just a being or thing, but a 
whole. Gadamer notes that Hegel recognizes the speculative character of 
language in order to rise above language. But, from the hermeneutical per-
spective, the goal is not to escape language. From within the speculative 
character of language, we can discern yet another fundamental structure of 
human finitude. To be a finite human is to speak (Sagen). Speaking is a 
mirroring. In speaking the "finite possibilities of the word are oriented to-
wards the sense intended, as towards the infinite" (WM p. 444; TM p. 469). 
Speaking, even in its most everyday forms, reflects a relation to the whole 
of being. Gadamer finds this speculative character intensified in the poetic 
word particularly as that word does not describe or signify but "opens up to 
us a world of the divine and the human" (WM p. 466; TM p. 470). 
Gadamer's essay "On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth" 
is especially helpful for what he means by speaking as a mirroring and for 
seeing how his description of human finitude is connected to religious expe-
rience. In this essay he says that poetry is "language in a pre-eminent sense" 
(RB p. 106). It shows us the fullest possibilities of human speaking in general. 
Poetry is autonomous (RB p. 109). This characteristic is also the case with 
religious texts and prayer according to Gadamer. These texts are autonomous 
in that they are self-fulfilling. Not only do they not require verification in 
something beyond the text, they refuse such verification. Gadamer says, 
"poetic language stands out as the highest fulfillment of the revealing (de-
[oun) which is the achievement of all speech" (RB p. 112). Gadamer terms 
what is revealed "nearness." What the poem holds up to us, like a mirror, is 
that we are beings subject to time faced with the task of making ourselves at 
home in the world. "What appears in the mirror is not the world, nor this or 
that thing in the world, but rather this nearness or familiarity itself in which 
we stand for awhile" (RB p. liS). Poetry as language in a pre-eminent sense 
shows us that as hearers and speakers, as those who belong within the medium 
of language (PH p. 68), it is language that gives us access to special forms 
of human experience, including and especially religious experience. 
The importance of the Incarnation for Gadamer's description is most evi-
dent in this account of saying as fundamental and as equiprimordial with 
belonging and hearing. Again, Bonhoeffer's articulation of Lutheran Chris-
tology is helpful. He explains Christ as Logos as living address. This address 
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takes place in history and is only accessible when a person speaks. Procla-
mation, always anew, is vital. Without the proclamation, there is no encounter. 
Following the Incarnation as a guide, Gadamer turns to the center of lan-
guage for an understanding of the new anthropology made possible by the 
mediation. This new anthropology describes human finitude as a belong-
ingness characterized by hearing and speaking. However, this anthropology 
with its emphasis on finitude does not exclude experience of the infinite, 
religious experience. 'The mediation of finite and infinite that is appropriate 
to us as finite beings lies in language-in the linguistic character of our 
experience of the world" (PH p. 80). 
Experience of the Infinite Appropriate to Human Finitude 
Gadamer's analysis maintains that the infinite is not to be experienced as 
infinite mind. The focus must remain on finitude. This has sometimes led to 
his work being quickly dismissed by religious thinkers. I have tried in the 
first parts of this paper to show that the focus on finitude is actually facilitated 
by means of religious concepts, particularly that of the Incarnation. In this 
final section, I will explore the experience of divine infinitude suggested by 
Gadamer's position. He gives direct sustained treatment to issues of religious 
experience in only a few essays. However, he makes many passing references 
which when looked at together constitute a rather significant treatment of 
religious experience (see Johnson). In looking at some of these references 
here, I will make use of the three fundamental structures of human finitude 
as a means of organizing his remarks. This approach seems appropriate since 
it is within this structure that he claims the finite and infinite are mediated. 
This approach also shows Gadamer's emphasis on the necessity of beginning 
in a tradition and shows how essential the Christian tradition is for Gadamer's 
own philosophical hermeneutics. 
Human finitude is characterized by a belongingness to a tradition that 
encounters us and that is inseparably connected with the emergence of the 
new. The tradition that encounters Gadamer and which he privileges as a 
source of religious experience is the Christian tradition, more specifically the 
German Lutheran tradition. We have already seen the importance of the 
Incarnation as Word for Gadamer's thought. In developing his understanding 
of the autonomous character of the poetic word, he calls upon the phrase "It 
stands written" (Es Stehet geschreiben) that is prominent in Luther's transla-
tion of the Bible (RB p. 108-09). In trying to understand the nature of the 
symbolic in art, he again encounters the Lutheran tradition and makes use of 
the example of Luther's insistence, in the face of Zwingli's challenge, that 
the bread and wine are the flesh and blood (RB p. 35). Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, Gadamer at one point says, "the genuine task of hermeneutics arises 
from the peculiar nature of the Christian proclamation" (RB p. 149). I take 
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him to mean his own work in hermeneutics belongs to this Christian 
tradition. These are all examples of Gadamer's encounter with his own 
tradition. For Gadamer, this tradition provides access to a particularly true 
form of experience. 
But Gadamer's description of belongingness includes not just encounter 
with tradition, but also facilitates the emergence of the new in dialogue with 
this tradition. The importance of this aspect of human finitude for the expe-
rience of divine infinitude is emphasized by Gadamer particularly in his 
explication of the importance of contemporaneity for religious life. Recently 
in responding to criticisms of hermeneutics by deconstructionists, Gadamer 
explains some of the stimulus for his own work. He traces the importance of 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger for his emphasis on dialogue, showing that all of 
them take their insight from the desire to follow the message of the gospels 
and the demand of the gospels that "Christ's death on the Cross should not 
be taken as an event lying far back in the past. .. we must be contemporaneous 
with this event" (Michelfelder p. 117). 
Gadamer's emphasis of the importance of festival in this context gives 
further indication of the sort of experience of divine infinitude that he finds 
appropriate to human finitude. A festival is not a mere repetition of an his-
torical event. Rather, a festival indicates that part of the event is its celebra-
tion. He says 
The nature of a festival is to be celebrated regularly. Thus its own original 
essence is always to be something different (even when celebrated in exactly 
the same way). An entity that exists only by always being something different 
is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history. 
It has its being only in becoming and return (WM p. 117; TM p. 123). 
The festival unites everyone who shares in the celebration and so manifests 
the uniqueness of the presence that is there. The experience of the infinite is 
historical and so connected to traditional and human ways of corporate cele-
bration. The individual does not meet the infinite in isolation from a human 
community. Yet, a celebration requires the participation of each individual. 
Any individual can withdraw from the celebration by not participating (RB 
p. 39). So, the experience of the infinite in this context is individual. Each 
person is encountered and so each person is called into question and is called 
into the dialogue of hearing and speaking. 
As hearing beings capable of uninterrupted listening, we are able to with-
hold our own expectations and remain open to encounter. Following 
Kierkegaard and Buber, Gadamer often characterizes this listening in terms 
of I and Thou (WM pp. 340ff; TM pp. 358ff; PH pp. 65-66). The experience 
of the infinite is first of all an experience of I-lessness. Notice that this is not 
a loss of finitude so that infinitude can be achieved. Rather, it is a recognition 
that hearing is essentially understanding. To hear requires that I not control or 
dominate understanding. Understanding requires a readiness that participates in 
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a spirit of openness. Hearing takes place when the will of each individual is 
held back so that the spirit of the subject matter, in this case of divine 
infinitude, can pervade. The experience of divine infinitude appropriate to 
human finitude is one that takes place in a community of listeners open to 
hearing the word. 
For the word to be heard it must be spoken. It is this speaking that is 
Gadamer's concern in a great deal of his work. His extensive work on aes-
thetics is fundamentally a description and exploration of this speaking. He 
maintains that the real being of a work of art is "what it is able to say, and 
this being reaches fundamentally beyond any historical confinement" (PH p. 
96). In the work of art we experience temporality in a radical manner. The 
work of art-language, music, movement-imposes a temporality on us. 
Gadamer says that it teaches us how to "tarry" (RB p. 45) and so grants "to 
us finite beings to relate to what we calI eternity" (RB p. 45). So, at one level, 
the experience of divine infinitude takes place as mimesis. Mimesis is repre-
sentation where we do not try or need to go beyond the representation to 
discover the content of what is represented. Gadamer says, "Mimesis does 
not imply a reference to an original as something other than itself, but means 
that something meaningful is there as itself' (RB p. 121). So, for Gadamer, 
the work of art is an appropriate speaking for the infinite because it makes 
present without requiring us to go beyond the work itself. Gadamer suggests 
that in the Christian tradition, this is why art in alI of its forms is important 
in ritual. 
But for the Christian tradition it is proclamation, the speaking of the Gos-
pel, that results in the fullest experience of divine infinitude. This is at one 
level a communal experience. Gadamer uses the concept of the symbol to 
explain this experience. He suggests that a symbol does not so much point 
to something that is already universalIy shared, but awakens "a shared con-
sciousness of something" (RB p. 150). What the symbol does is give rise to 
the experience of "this is You" (again Gadamer is calling on Luther). At the 
level of symbol, what the proclamation does is enable us to make ourselves 
at home in the world. It shows us what we can achieve and so disturbs us 
into the recognition of the demand on us to accomplish such things. And so 
the experience of the infinite is there in our learning to dwell in the world. 
Yet, Gadamer maintains that in the Christian proclamation there is a further 
experience of recognition, one that he says has the quality of a sign. This 
quality of the proclamation is very individual. He says, "It is not something 
that everyone has been able to see, not something to which one can refer, and 
yet, if it is taken as a sign, there is something incontestably certain about it" 
(RB p. 152). According to Gadamer, this is the uniqueness of the Christian 
message. It speaks to us as individuals and transcends the self-recognition of 
symbolic speaking. It shows us "what we cannot achieve" (RB p. 153). This 
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for Gadamer seems to be the fullest experience of divine infinitude. In keep-
ing with the insights of Kierkegaard, the fullest experience of the infinite 
shows me my finitude and demands of me the individual that I hope against 
all expectation. 
Gadamer's remembrance of Rudolf Bultmann illustrates the experience of 
the infinite appropriate to human finitude. For his funeral, Bultmann re-
quested that the community gather and that there be singing and the reading 
of the scripture. The funeral was not a time of eulogizing, but a time of 
proclamation simply put forward to be heard by those who could look for 
themselves and see themselves there (PA p. 60). 
Implications for the Philosophy of Religion 
This reading of Gadamer, beginning with the concept of the Incarnation, leads 
to several implications. It positions his work firmly in the Christian tradition, 
especially as it has been received through Lutheranism and through the re-
ligious writings of Kierkegaard and the philosophical writings of Heidegger. 
He should be read as a philosopher who, like most continental philosophers 
in the modern era, continues to live in and work out the implications of this 
tradition. As such his articulation of human finitude should be understood as 
an articulation that emerges from this tradition. 
This reading also carries implications for contemporary directions in the 
philosophy of religion. One of the most important directions in contemporary 
work concerns the issue of religious pluralism. John Hick in An Interpretation 
of Religion and in the fourth edition of Philosophy of Religion is particularly 
concerned with the dialogue of world religions and with the need for devel-
oping a philosophical framework for religious pluralism. He is primarily 
concerned with developing a framework that helps us schematize the various 
images and experiences of God or the Absolute. His hypothesis is that "the 
great religious traditions of the world represent different human perceptions 
of and responses to the same infinite divine Reality" (Philosophy of Religion 
p. 119). Gadamer's hermeneutics implies a caution and a complication for 
those of the Western tradition who hope to develop this framework for plu-
ralism. It is not simply our experience and understanding of divine infinitude 
that is conditioned by our particular traditions. Our traditions also set the 
horizons for our experience and understanding of our own finitude. Within 
these horizons we can dialogue with other traditions, but it is this framework 
that enables us to be open to such dialogue. We will need to address the 
possibility of a plurality of experiences of human finitude as well as a plu-
rality of experiences of divine infinitude. We cannot arbitrarily move into an 
experience and understanding of human finitude that has no connections with 
our tradition. Developing our experience of human finitude by incorporating 
any insights from other traditions will require long dialogue that will allow 
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connections to arise. The task is more than that of developing philosophical 
frameworks. We must take the time to engage in conversation and risk being 
transformed in those conversations. 
Gadamer's work also carries implications for work in philosophy of relig-
ion that is concerned with themes of non-domination. Gadamer's rootedness 
in his tradition should not be taken as a commitment to dogmatic religious 
tradition. While he emphasizes the importance of tradition, it is tradition with 
which we are in dialogue and which we question. Only a living tradition can 
provide the basis for the mediation of human finitude and divine infinitude. 
Gadamer's work continually emphasizes the importance of "bringing people 
to a self-understanding of themselves" (RAS p. 149). Fundamental to this 
self-understanding is the need to rid ourselves of illusions of domination and 
control. Focusing on the structure of hearing and its I-lessness helps us to 
withhold our own expectations and impositions. This part of Gadamer's 
analysis lends strong support to the need to listen to feminist, liberation, and 
ecological philosophical frameworks. All of these frameworks seek to de-
velop self-understandings that are non-dominating and to reflect on images 
and experiences of divine infinitude that both open up such self-under-
standings and are mediated by non-dominating ways of dwelling. 
On the other hand, Gadamer's reflections on human finitude and experience 
of the infinite seem to raise a caution for those who would focus on that part 
of religious experience that shows us what we can do and emphasizes our 
emancipatory responsibilities. The experience of the infinite that Gadamer 
suggests is appropriate to us is one that places us in a spirit of openness to 
that which confronts us with our own ignorance and a recognition of what 
we cannot achieve. As such, the experience of the infinite leads to a distrust 
of "any instrumental attitude toward truth, knowledge, or interpersonal rela-
tions" (Misgeld p. 176). We cannot grasp the infinite. Any desire we have to 
experience the infinite must be given a careful direction. We must not impose 
but must be open to encounter and recognize that what we experience of the 
infinite is what is in the encounter. We cannot go beyond this experience. 
University of Dayton 
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